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By THOMAS CLiFFoRD BHLIG*
O NE of the most important problems arising under any method
of admimstering an insolvent estate concerns the legal posi-
tion of the creditor who refuses to participate in either a composi-
tion or a corporate reorganization which has the approval of a
large majority of the creditors. If the estate is being administered
under a general assignment or some other extra-judicial method,
the safety of the liqudator from possible future embarrassment
requires the virtually unanimous consent -of the creditors.' If
bankruptcy is the method of administration used, the act of 1898
provides for a composition wherein the will of the majority in
number and amount of the creditors whose claims have been al-
lowed may be imposed upon the minority. 2 If a receiversip in
equity looking toward the reorganization of a corporate debtor is
employed, the ghost of the Boyd Cwe3 still haunts the interests
fostering the new project.
In a previous article4 I traced the attitude of the equity court
toward this "problem of the dissenting minority creditor" from
the Boyd decision in 19135 to Cortell v. Morris White, Inc.0 which
at that time (February, 1933) had been decided by the circuit
court of appeals for the second circuit and later had been carried
on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. I sought
to show the unsettled state of the law in this particular field, but,
even so, I contended that equity gradually has extended the scope
*Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University, Morgantown,
West Virginia.
'This point is discussed in Senate Document No. 65, entitled Strength-
ening of Procedure in the Judicial System, by Thomas D. Thacher, former
solicitor-general of the United States, at-70.
2Bankruptcy Act, sec. 12, 11 U. S. C. A., sec. 30, 1 Mason's U. S. Code
tit. 11, sec. 30.
8Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd, (1913) 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct.
554, 57 L. Ed. 931.
4Billig, Corporate Reorganization. Equity vs. Bankruptcy, (1933) 17
MINNESOT. LAW REVIEw 237-269.
5Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd, (1913) 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct.
554, 57 L. Ed. 931.
6(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1931) 54 F (2d) 255.
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of the "consent receivership" to meet at least some of the needs
growing out of the corporate reorganization situation.
This paper will discuss (1) the importance of the Coriell deci-
sion to the problem of the dissenting minority creditor, and (2)
the 1933 amendments to the bankruptcy act as affecting the same
problem.
1. NATIONAL SURETY Co. v. CORIELL
This case was decided on May 22, 1933, by the Supreme Court
of the United States.7 The debtor corporation, Morris White,
Inc., was one of the world's largest manufacturers of women's
handbags and fancy leather goods. After many years of prosper-
ity, Morris White, Inc., became involved financially during the
recent depression. For six months prior to April 6, 1931, its
bank creditors had been in control of the corporation. On the
latter date these same bank creditors placed Morris White, Inc.,
in a consent receivership, the suit being brought by one Coriell, a
citizen of New Jersey, in the federal court for the southern dis-
trict of New York.
The bill contained the usual allegations of frozen assets far in
excess of liabilities, of the dearth of cash with which to meet cur-
rent obligations, of the danger that executions levied separately by
creditors individually might destroy the business. "On the same
day on which the bill was filed, the defendant answered, admitting
the allegations and assenting to the appointment of a temporary
receiver. 'The Irving Trust Company was appointed. The re-
ceiver employed as counsel the solicitor for the complainant."8
Thus appeared a consent receivership so typical of the practice in
the southern district of New York.'
A creditors' committee at once started work on a reorganiza-
tion plan which the district court on May 27, 1931, directed the
receiver to accept. In brief, the plan provided that the assets
should be purchased at a private sale by Mrs. Lily White, wife of
Morris White (Morris White owned virtually all the stock in the
old corporation). Mrs. White was then to transfer the assets,
subject to existing liens, to a new corporation to be called the
Morris White Handbag Corporation. Creditors of the old cor-
poration having claims of $100 or less were to be paid in cash.
Claims of preferred creditors, expenses of administration, and
WNational Surety Co. v. Coriell, (1933) 289 U. S. 426, 53 Sup. Ct. 678.
8(1933) 289 U. S. 426, 53 Sup. Ct. 678, 679.
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expenses of the creditors' committee were, to be assumed by the
new corporation. All other creditors were to be paid, not in cash,
but in unsecured notes of the new company to the extent of twenty
per cent of their claims and in preferred stock of the new com-
pany to the extent of the remaining eighty per cent. Neither of
the Whites nor anyone else was to advance any new money to the
Morris White Handbag Corporation, but Morris White was to
be paid a salai'y of $60,000 a year for three years by the new
company. All the common stock in the new corporation was to
be held by the Whites who were thus to control the directorate.
Althoigh, as previously noted, the district court approved the
reorganization plan, considerable opposition to it developed at the
hearings on May 26th and 27th. A "substantial minority" of the
creditors alleged that no inventory of the assets had been made
either by the receiver or by the court; that the amount and char-
acter of the liabilities had never been determined;9 and that cer-
tain of the bank creditors-who had been in control of Morris
White, Inc., prior to the receivership-had received unlawful pref-
9The Supreme Court in the following statement from its opinion sub-
stantiated these allegations (53 Sup. Ct. 678, 679-680):
"The receiver had made no inventory and had not determined ihe
amount of the liabilities. No bne had made even an estimate of the value
of the assets as of the date of the order to show cause, or, except as stated
below, as of the date of the hearing. No figures were presented to indicate
the course and results of the business while under the informal supervision
and control of the banks, during the five months prior to the appointment of
the temporary receiver; or during the seven weeks following his appoint-
ment. But that the bill had grossly overstated the assets was obvious. In-
stead of assets exceeding $4,000,000 as there alleged, it appeared that those
available were worth, at most, a fourth of that amount. Items aggregating
.$2,277,714.89 consisted of obligations and securities of' associated and sub-
sidiary companies, which were probably worthless. The substantial assets
consisted, according to the books, of the following items: Merchandise and
supplies, which had cost $1,241,208.09; bills receivable aggregating $301,-
852.12, of which $251,409.42 were pledged to the banks; machinery entered
as having cost, less depreciation, $74,265.01; and $5,614.60 cash. Based on
an appraisal made by a sub-committee shortly after the appointment of the
temporary receiver, thd Creditors' Committee estimated the value of the
merchandise as of that date to be $717,000, on the basis of a continuing
business. Counsel for the receiver, estimating the value of the merchandise
as of the date of the hearing, on the basis of a continuing business, stated
that it was wnrth about $462.500; and that there was cash on hand in the
amount of $54,000 and unpledged accounts receivable of $p7,000. He
stated that the committee estimated the value of the merchandise, if dis-
posed of at forced sale, to be $357,000.- Another statement was made to
the effect that the committee estimated the total value of the assets at
forced sale to be $182.000. Whether -this figure included the assets pledged
to the banks was left in doubt. The court was told that Morris White had
an informal assurance that banks would give to the new company the nec-
essary temporary accommodations required for working capital."
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erences. The minority creditors also "protested against disposing
of the assets otherwise than for cash after public sale and without
competitive bids being sought."'1  The creditors' committee, on
the other hand, contended that, as the handbag business was sea-
sonal in character, any delay in disposing of the assets would prove
disastrous.
After the district court had so decreed, the corporate assets
were transferred to the Morris White Handbag Corporation which
immediately began operation of the business. The transfer was
made privately. Competitive bids neither were sought nor sub-
mitted. The National Surety Company and other dissenting credi-
tors at once appealed the case to the circuit court of appeals which
-five months later--"reversed the decree of the district court and
remanded the cause for further proceedings in accordance with
its opinion.""
There were at least two points in the opinion of the circuit
court of appeals which would have had extremely important
bearing on future corporate reorganization law had the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision. In the first place, the circuit court
of appeals said that a court of equity lacks "power to compel a
creditor of any kind to accept stocks or promises to pay in the
future in full extinguishment of his claim, without being afforded
the alternative of receiving his proportionate share of the pro-
ceeds of the conventional sale of the property in cash."12 In the
second place, the Court held that, while ordinarily dissenting credi-
tors are entitled to a public sale with competitive bidding, in this
particular case their interests would be fully protected "by hav-
ing an appraisal of the value of their respective claims made be-
fore a master, to be appointed, who will take an account of the
assets and liabilities of Morris White, Inc., ascertaining the value
of the assets as if sold at a public sale"' 8 and then paying them in
cash their proportionate shares after expenses of administration
have been satisfied. If the payment to the dissenting creditors was
not made in cash, then they were deemed entitled to collect through




12(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 255, 260; (1933) 289 U. S. 426,
53 Sup. Ct. 678, 680. (Italics mine.)
13(C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 255, 260; (1933) 289 U. S. 426, 53
Sup. Ct. 678, 680.
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It will be seen readily that here at last was a case which would
give the Supreme Court of the United States an opportunity to
rule on some of the unsettled questions arising out of its decision
twenty years before in Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd.14 One
of these questions may be stated thus: If a court is to stamp a
reorganization plan as fair, must the plan offer the unsecured
creditors of the old corporation a cash payment of the value of
their claims as determined by the court, as an alternative to shares
or securities in the new corporation? In my previous article at-
tention was called to Mr. Justice Lamar's famous dictum in the
Boyd Case" wherein he said that it is not always "necessary to
pay an-unsecured creditor in cash as a condition of stockholders
retaining an interest in the reorganized company. His interest can
be preserved by the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds
or preferred stock." Mention also was made in the former paper
of subsequent cases in the inferior federal courts in which this
issue was raised. Emphasis, too, was laid on the fact that it was
impossible to state exactly the condition of the law on the point.
In fact, the writer went no further than to venture the following
prediction:
"The theory that it is'always necessary to offer the unsecured
creditor his share in cash as an alternative to stock or securities
in the new corporation * * * may be on the way to the discard,
although an affirmance by the Supreme Court in the Coriell Case
will go a long way in the direction of perpetuating this theory."
However, before commenting here upon what the Supreme
Court did do in the Coriell Case, let us notice the other point made
by the circuit court of appeals-the right of the dissenting credi-
tor to compel a public sale of the assets.
The circuit court of appeals, it will be recalled, said that in this
specific case a public sale of the assets was not necessary. Per-
haps this conclusion was reached because no mortgage bonds were
outstanding against Morris White, Inc., with the consequent right
of foreclosure in the bondholders. At all events, on this particu-
lar point the decision is in line with progiessive legal thought
which recognizes the cumbersome and expensive method of public
sale for what it is-a relic of the past which often keeps the
court from direct control over the reorganization plan.16
14(1913) 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931.
15(1913) 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931.
16 See, for example, Thacher, Strengthening of Procedure in the Judi-
cial System, Sen. Doc. No. 65, at 90,; Cutcheon, An Examination of De-
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Such was the Coriell Case and its treatment in the inferior
federal courts. And, needless to say, its disposition by the Su-
preme Court of the United States was awaited eagerly, especially
at a time when each day brought news of more and more corpora-
tions plunging into receiverships. Would the Supreme Court de-
clare that the district court had the power to order the distributive
share of each creditor to be fixed by some other method than by a
public sale? Would the Supreme Court hold that the district
court could compel participation in the reorganization by the dis-
senters without the alternative of a share of the assets in cash?
The Supreme Court, however, in its decision in National
Surety Co. v. Coriell never reached the point of answering the
foregoing questions. After raising them, the Court, per Brandeis,
J., concluded :17
"We have no occasion to pass on any of these contentions,
for we are of opinion that the decree approving the plan should
have been reversed in its entirety because the procedure pursued
by the district court was improper."
Consequently, the decree of the circuit court of appeals was
reversed; that of the district court entered February 2, 1932,18 was
vacated; and the case was remanded to the district court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion. The reasons given by Mr. Justice Brandeis for the Su-
preme Court's decision were two. In the first place, he said that
the district court had entered a decree approving the reorganiza-
tion plan without having recourse to adequate data.19 As has
been noted previously, 20 there had been no appraisal of the assets
by a disinterested person, no adequate record of the operation of
vices Employed to Obviate the Embarrassments to Reorganizations Created
by the Boyd Case, published in Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing,
Reorganization and Regulation, 73 et seq.; Swaine, Reorganization of Cor-
porations; Certain Developments of the Last Decade, (1927) 27 Col. L.
Rev. 901, 924; Rosenberg, Reorganization-The Next Step, (1922) 22 Col.
L. Rev. 14, 26.
1'7(1933) 289 U. S. 426, 53 Sup. Ct. 678, 681.
26Pursuant to the mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals, the District
Court entered on February 2, 1932, a decree which ordered that (subject to
the orders to be made), "the reorganization plan approved by it June 15,
1931, be allowed to continue in operation and the Morris White Handbag
Corporation be and is hereby permitted to continue in the conduct of the
business heretofore transferred to it .... "
"
9
"The district court had before it, in support of the plan, only in-
formal, inadequate, and conflicting ex parte assertions unsupported by testi-
mony." From the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, (1933) 289 U. S. 426,
53 Sup. Ct. 678, 681.20Note 9, supra.
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the business during the five months period just prior to the re-
ceiversl~ip when it was controlled by its bank creditors, "no de-
pendable schedule -of liabilities of the corporation showing the
number of creditors, the amount owed to each, and the collateral
held."' In the second place, the Supreme Court felt that in this
case particularly the district court should have made extraordinary
efforts to reach "an informal, independent judgment," 22 inas-
much as "the proceeding was not an adversary one; and jurisdic-
tion rested wholly upon the consent of the defendant corpora-
tion.' ' 23 The bank creditors, who favored the reorganization plan,
were to a large extent protected by the pledge of assets; the mer-
chandise creditors, who also favored it, were interested not only
as creditors but as sellers of goods in the future to the new cor-
poration. "On the other hand, the dissenting creditors, largely
credit indemnity companies, were anxious to have determined the
amounts of their -risks and to obtain as promptly as possible divi-
dends in cash.1 2
4
Such then was the Coriell Case, the first decision since 1926 25
in which the Supreme Court faced some-of the unsolved -problems
inherited from Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd. Unfortunately,
however, for those interested in the corporate reorganization field,
the facts in the Coriell Case were such that it could be disposed of
without adding much to'the jurisprudence of corporate reorgani-
zation.2 6 All that the case did was to sound another warning2 7 to
21(1933) 289 U. S. 426, 53 Sup.' Ct. 678, 682.
22(1933) 289 U. S. 426, 53 Sup. Ct. 678.
23(1933) 289 U. S. 426, 53 Sup. Ct. 678.
24(1933) 289 U. S. 426, 53 Sup. Ct. 678.
251n 1926 the Supreme Court decided Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v.
Central Union Trust Co., (1926) 271 U. S. 445, 46 Sup. Ct. 549, 70 L. Ed.
1028.
26Anothe factor may have influenced somewhat the decision of the Su-
preme Court. The Morris White Handbag Corporation had a short business
life. It was adjudged bankrupt on April 29,-1932. On June 6, 1932, a sale
of all its tangible assets for $53,850 was confirmed by the bankruptcy court.
Neither the Morris White Handbag Corporation, nor its trustee in bank-
ruptcy, nor the purchaser at the bankruptcy sale was a party to National
Surety Co. v. Coriell.
27See, for example, the dictum of the late Chief Justice Taft in Harkin
v. Brundage, (1928) 276 U. S. 36, 52, 55, 48 Sup. Ct. 268, 72 L. Ed. 457.
Note the following significant sentence from the opinion of Mr. Justice
Cardozo in Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., Receiver, (1931) 286 U. S.
334, 345, 52 Sup. Ct. 512, 76 L. Ed. 1136: "This court has had occasion to
point out the abuses from friendly receiverships forestalling the normal
process of administration in bankruptcy and enabling a tottering business to
continue while creditors are held at bay, Harkin v. Brundage, (1928) 276
U. S. 36, 52, 54, 48 Sup. Ct. 268, 72 L. Ed. 457; cf. Kingsport Press v. Brief
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the inferior federal courts as to the need for careful scrutiny in
the granting of consent receiverships and the approving of reor-
ganization plans .resulting therefrom.
II. THE RECENT BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS
It long has been the contention of certain writers on corporate
reorganization that the real solution to the "problem of the dis-
senting minority creditor" lies not in the field of equity but in that
of bankruptcy.28 As has been suggested previously,29 some of
the lower federal courts, through the use of their general equity
powers, have gone far in the direction of obviating the difficulties
of the Boyd Case.30 However, as has also been pointed out, the
Supreme Court of the United States, up to the present time, has
left unanswered some of the most perplexing questions res.ulting
from that decision. Consequently, since the courts are in confus-
ion, and since any state statute which attempted retroactively
to force a composition or a reorganization plan upon an unwilling
minority of creditors obviously would impair the obligation of
their contracts, 31 the aforementioned writers have felt that the
English Systems, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 497, 499, 500. Re-
ceiverships for conservation have at times a legitimate function, but they
are to be watched with jealous eyes lest their function be perverted." Again
in Shapiro v. Wilgus, (1932) 287 U. S. 348, 53 Sup. Ct. 142, 145, 77 L. Ed.
149, Mr. Justice Cardozo said: "We have given warning more than once,
however, that the remedy [receivership] in such circumstances [consent] is
not to be granted loosely, but is to be watched with jealous eyes."2
sCutcheon, An Examination of Devices Employed to Obviate. the Em-
barrassments to Reorganizations Created by the Boyd Case, published in
Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization & Regulation
73; Swaine, Corporate Reorganization under the Federal Bankruptcy
Power, (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 317; Swaine, Reorganization-The Next
Step: Reply to Rosenberg, (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 523; Rosenberg, An
Open Letter Containing Proposals for Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act,
(1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 333; Rosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization,
(1917) 17 Col. L. Rev. 523. Cf. Rosenberg, Reorganization-The Next
Step, (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 14; Garrison, The Power of Congress over
Corporate Reorganizations, (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 343.29 See Billig, Corporate Reorganization: Equity vs. Bankruptcy, (1933)
17 MINESorA LAW Rsvrmv 237, 264, et seq.
3
°Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd, (1913) 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct.
554, 57 L. Ed. 931.
SiVarious statutory schemes have been devised to circumvent this re-
sult. See, for example, Delaware Gen. Corp. Law (1931) sec. 5 (9) ; Ken-
tuckv Stat. (Carroll. 1930) secs. 7 71a (Reorganization of Insolvent Rail-
roads and Bridge Companies); New York Stock Corp. Law, 1930, secs.
95-99: West Virpinia Off. Code. 1931. ch. 31. art. 1. eec. 6 (h) ; Minnesota,
Laws 1933, ch. 300, sec. 54, discussed in Hoshour, The Minnesota Business
Cornoration Act. (1933) 18 MT\"'f S'T A LAW REVTFVw 1. 12. See alco
Gilfllan v. Union Canal Co., (1883) 109 U. S. 401, 406, 3 Sup. Ct. 304, 27
L. Ed. 977.
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only feasible remedy lies in extending the composition provisions
of the bankruptcy act. A section of the British companies act,32
which provides that a reorganization plan acceptable to a three-
fourths majority in value of the creditors in a given class shall be
binding upon the-other members of such class, has been the model
of those who would find a statutory solution for the problem of
the dissenting minority creditor.
In keeping with this approach, section 76 of the original Hast-
ings Bill was drafted.33  It provided a plan for bringing the reor-
ganization of a "moneyed, business, or commercial corporation"
under bankruptcy through a voluntary petition by the corporation
itself rather than through a fictitious'involuntary proceeding such
as. prevails in the typical "consent receivership" in equity. Section
76 was framed on the theory that the bankruptcy court should have
direct control over any plan of reorganization which might be
submitted to it, but that no such plan should be confirmed until it
had been accepted- in writing by creditors holding two-thirds in
amount of the claims allowed in their particular class. After con-
firmation the plan was to be binding upon the corporation, its
creditors and its stockholders.34
Although the provision of section 76, and those of its various
statutory successors,3 5 caused much discussion, 8 the question of
the wisdom of its enactment again has become academic as far
32Note 4 to Garrison, Reorganization of Railroads under the Bankruptcy
Act, (1933) 1 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 71 sums up the English statutory pro-
visions as follows: "Since 1870 England has had a reorganization statute.
In its original form it provided that a plan affecting a given class of credi-
tors could be made binding upon the consent of a majority in number
representing three-fourths in value of the creditors of such class. In 1900
the statute was enlarged by the adoption of a similar provision relating to
stockholders. For the latest form of the statute see the Companies Act,
1929, 19-20 Geo. 5, ch. 23, secs. 153 to 155; and Sophian, The Companies
Act, 1929. The Canadian Bankruptcy Act contains a reorganization section
modelled on the English Companies Act (Act of July 7, 1919, 9-10 Geo. 5,
ch. 36, sec. 13 as amended by act of June 28, 1922, 12-13 Geo. 5)." See
Fraser, Reorganization of Companies in Canada, (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 932.
33See Billig, Corporate Reorganization: Equity vs. Bankruptcy, (1933)
17 MINNESOrA LAW REVIEW 237-39 for a discussion of section-76 of the
Hastings Bill and its successors.
34See Tharher, Strengthening of Procedure in the Judicial System, Sen.
Doc. No. 65, 90-92.
85 Supra note 33.
86See, for example, the symposium, Corporate Reorganization-An
Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 317-350; Payne,
Fair and Equitable Plans of Corporate Reorganization, (1933) 20 Va. L.
Rev. 37.
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as "moneyed, business, or commercial corporations" are concerned.
While certain amendments to the bankruptcy act were enacted in
the closing days of the last Congress, section 76 never was passed.37
Consequently the reorganization of private corporations remains a
function of equity rather than of bankruptcy.
Let us notice for a moment the amendments to the Act of 1898
which were passed on March 3, 1933 and see if any of them
throws any light on the specific phase of corporate reorganization
law we are considering-the problem of the dissenting minority
creditor. Section 7438 is new and provides a statutory composi-
tion and extension plan for individual debtors. It has nothing to
do with corporations and their reorganization. Neither does sec-
tion 75,30 another new one which is concerned with agricultural
compositions and extensions. In fact, it is not until we reach
section 774 -- reorganization of railroads engaged in interstate
commerce-that the problem of the minority creditor who will not
"climb on the bandwagon" is once more encountered.
It is not the purpose here to describe in minute detail the
provisions of section 77. As the footnote indicate, 4 1 that task has
been performed already by competent authorities. Briefly, it may
be said that section 77 provides a statutory substitute for the re-
ceivership in equity of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce.
The railroad itself may file with the bankruptcy court in the dis-
trict in which its principal executive or operating office. is located
a petition stating that it "is insolvent or unable to meet its debts
as they mature and that it desires a plan of reorganization. 42
37The House of Representatives passed the measure as a part of H. R.
14359, 72 Cong., 2d Sess. A similar bill, S. 5551, was introduced in the
Senate but was not enacted.
3811 U. S. C. A., sec. 202, 1 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 202.
3011 U. S. C. A., sec. 203, 1 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 203.
-011 U. S. C. A., sec. 205, 1 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 205.
41Garrison, Reorganization of Railroads under the Bankruptcy Act,
(1933) 1 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 71; Rodgers and Groom, Reorganization
of Railroad Corporations Under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, (1933)
33 Col. L. Rev. 571; Weiner, Reorganization under Section 77: A Comment,
(1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 834; Hanna, Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act, (1933) 1 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 448; Frank, Some Realistic Reflections
on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization, (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 698,
707; Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act. (1933) 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 18. See Jacobs. The Interstate Commerce Commission and Interstate
Railroad Reorganizations, (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 855.
4211 U. S. C. A., sec. 205, 1 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 205.
Creditors of the railroad having claims or interests aggregating not less
than ten per cent of all the road's indebtedness, may, with the approval of
the Interstate Commerce Commission. file an involuntary petition against
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After approving the petition, the court may appoint a temporary
trustee (who later, after a hearing, may become permanent) from
a panel of standing trustees selected by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The trustee takes title to the debtor's property
wherever located, thus eliminating the need for ancillary proceed-
ings. After proper notice has been given, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (with which a copy of the original petition
must be filed) holds public hearings in the receivership. At these
hearings reorganization plans may be submitted by the debtor
railroad, by the trustee, or by creditors who represent at least ten
per cent of the claims in any given class. The commission is re-
quired to recommend a plan of reorganization to the court--either
one of those submitted or a plan which the commission itself has
devised. If the creditors accept the plan recommended by the
commission (the method of acceptance will be discussed in some
detail presently), the plan is certified by the commission to the
court, which, after a public hearing, may accept it or reject it. If
the court accepts the plan, it simply orders the property transferred
either to the debtor railroad or to some new corporation created
under the reorganization scheme. Thus the need for a public
sale of the debtor's assets under a mortgage foreclosure has been
entirely eliminated.
This paper, of course, is concerned primarily with the question
of acceptance of the plan by the creditors under section 77. The
statute provides that if two-thirds in amount of any given class o f
creditors or stockholders accept the plan it shall thereupon become
binding upon all the other members of such class. And this result
follows even though the rights of the creditors and stockholders
after the reorganization are wholly different from what they were
before. Thus, an acceptance of the plan by two-thirds in amount
of the members (creditors or stockholders) of a given class may
impair the contract rights of all the members of the class. Neither
is it necessary, in order-to force the plan upon non-assenters, to
offer them in cash their distributive shares of the proceeds of what
under a proceeding in equity would be a sale to the new, corpora-
tion.4
3
the railroad "stating that such railroad corporation is insolvent or unable
to meet its debts as they mature and that such creditors propose that it
shall effect a reorganization."
43Compare the provisions of the Bank Conservation Act of March 9,
1933, 12 U. S. C. A., secs. 201-211, 1 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 12, secs. 201-
11, particularly sec. 207 entitled Reorganization; Consent of Depositors and
Creditors. See the Bank Conservator Statute of West Virginia enacted
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The sweeping character of this provision of section 77 is viv-
idly described in the following language by Dean Lloyd K. Garri-
son of the University of Wisconsin Law School," who, as special
assistant to the attorney general, was co-author with former Solici-
tor General Thacher of the "Thacher Report" of December 5,
1931 :45
"Complete flexibility is thus provided. Preferred stock or
debentures, for example, may be substituted for mortgage bonds;
unsecured claims may be made payable in stock; principal or inter-
est or both may be scaled down; preferred stock may be changed
into common; and so on, without limit, subject only to the require-
ment that the plan shall be equitable. Since securities with a lien
prior to any previously issued may be provided for in the plan,
adequate security can be given for the new money which is usually
necessary to complete the reorganization and provide sufficient
working capital. Hitherto, in the absence either of unanimous
consent by the holders of mortgage securities, or of payment to
the dissenters of the cash value of their claims against the prop-
erty, there has been no way of giving the new money a prior lien;
and this difficulty has prevented many forms of advantageous
reorganizations. Under the new legislation, assuming always that
the plan is fair, two-thirds in amount of any class of mortgage
creditors may compel the entire class, without payment of cash to
dissenters, to subordinate their liens to a new prior lien or even
to abandon their liens altogether."
CONCLUSION
This paper was written primarily for the purpose of bringing
down to date the former article, Corporate Reorganization: Equity
vs. Bankruptcy, which was published last February before the
Coriell Case was decided and prior to the enactment of the recent
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. No attempt has been made
here to present any particular thesis. The writer still believes that
the general jurisdiction of equity over corporations is broad
enough to enable it, even without the aid of a statute, to find a
solution for the problem of the dissenting minority creditor. As
emphasized in the previous article, a step in the direction of solv-
ing this problem would be no more radical than several others
which have been taken in molding the jurisprudence of corporate
April 12, 1933. Advance Copy, Acts of the Legislature of West Virginia,
Extraordinary Session, 1933 at 66. See note, Reorganization of Banking
Corporations, (1930) 28 Mich. L. Rev. 1052.
"Garrison, The Power of Congress over Corporate Reorganizations,
(1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 343.
45Supra note 1.
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reorganization. Furthermore, at least since In re Metropolitan
Railway Receivership,4 6 the consent receivership with all its limi-
tations-and they are many-has been the tool with which cor-
poration lawyers have worked in preparing the way for the reor-
ganization lof a corporation in financial difficulty. The reports
contain a host of federal decisions covering virtually every angle
of the consent receivership process. Presumably these decisions
now are only so much paper and ink as far as railroad reorgani-
zations are concerned. 47 Before the close of the next session of
Congress it is possible they may occupy a similar place as far as
the reorganization of "moneyed, business, or commercial corpora-
tions" is concerned. It will then become necessary to build up a
new body of case law interpreting the several provisions of these
new corporate reorganization statutes-a task probably of consid-
erable magnitude. 48
However, the proof of the legal pudding is, in 1933, perhaps
even more than ever in the proverbial eating. Section 77 of the
bankruptcy act may have been hastily and imperfectly drawn, 49
and it may require considerable interpretation before it succeedIs
in setting up a smooth-running system for railroad reorganization.
Nevertheless, if it furnishes us with what its proponents claim for
it-an efficient and economical method of adjusting the affairs of
a financially embarrassed railroad-then it will be worthy of tak-
ing a place along with the other great epoch-making statutes of
Anglo-American law.
46(1908) 208 U. S. 90, 28 Sup. Ct. 219, 52 L. Ed. 403.47Except, of course, with respect to certain matters where the statute
either expressly or by implication has preserved the rules and principles
evolved by the equity court.4 And, as is pointed out by Rodgers and Groom, Reorganization of
Railroad Corporations under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, (1933) 33
Col. L. Rev. 571, 616 "there will be a multitude of questions, the answers
to which must be had by reference to bankruptcy legislation and decisions
difficult of application to situations never therein contemplated."49Rodgers and Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations Under
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 571, 616, par-
ticularly their footnote 88.
